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Article I, Section nine of the U.S. Constitution clearly assigns the
spending power of the United States to Congress: "[n]o money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made
by law."' Yet in 1973, the House Rules Committee concluded that
Congress was not adequately discharging its spending responsibilities.2
Specifically, the committee asserted that existing congressional budget
procedures left Congress unable to fulfill the "two main . . . purposes
of the budget process: to manage the economy and to determine public
priorities."3 The Rules Committee enumerated several deficiencies in
the budget process. First, the committee noted Congress' lack of
knowledge concerning the total amount of federal money spent in any
given year.4 Second, the committee pointed out that over half of fed-
eral spending was done outside the annual appropriations process, thus
making much of the federal budget "relatively uncontrollable."5
* A.B., Kenyon College, 1980; J.D., Case Western Reserve School of Law. The author now
serves as a staff attorney for the Senate Budget Committee. The views expressed herein are
not intended to represent the views of the Senate Budget Committee or its staff.
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7.
2. H.R. REP. No. 658, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
3462, 3466 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
3. Id. at 21, reprinted at 3468. While the determination of public priorities has been a function
of the congressional budget process since the inception of our Constitution, the impact of the
federal budget on the general economy has become significant particularly in the last fifty
years. Following World War I, federal spending was as low as $3 billion. By 1973, when
budget reform was being considered, the budget had grown to over $400 billion. The na-
tional debt had also risen from $1 billion to more than $700 billion. STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS:
A GENERAL EXPLANATION 4 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter cited as BUDGET PROCESS].
4. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 24, reprinted at 3470. The committee concluded that "Con-
gress has no way to determine how much will be spent in a single year (d)espite the signifi-
cance of the budget totals. ... Senator William Roth (R-Del.) has explained the reason for
this: "Before 1974, the appropriations and tax committees of the Senate and the House did
their work in splendid isolation, spending money and raising revenues with little or no refer-
ence to each other or the various external forces affecting the Nation's economy." Review of
the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974: Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981) (opening statement of
Senator Roth) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
5. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 22, reprinted at 3469. The committee explained that budget
uncontrollability is tied to the use of "backdoor spending," that is, spending outside of the
appropriations process:
Backdoor spending comes in a variety of forms. One type is contract authority where
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Third, the Committee cited Congress' failure to complete its spending
measures before the fiscal year begins.6
In the early 1970's, President Nixon initiated unprecedented im-
poundments of congressionally appropriated funds, claiming that his
actions were necessitated by Congress' ineffectiveness in federal budg-
eting.7 These impoundments, together with the three deficiencies in the
budget process noted above, moved Congress8 to enact the Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.9 With this Act,
Congress imposed upon itself a comprehensive new budget process
designed to: "provide a system of impoundment control"; "assure ef-
fective congressional control over the budgetary process" and "estab-
lish national budget priorities."'
Nine years after its enactment, the future of the Congressional
Budget Act is unclear. Congress has been unsuccessful in meeting
Budget Act timetables," and has departed in some important ways
from the budget process established by the act. 2 Despite these depar-
tures from procedure, the Budget Act has remained unchanged.
Hence, recently there have been numerous proposals to amend the
Budget Act.' 3  Senate Bill 20,14 introduced by Senator William Roth
(R-Del.) in 1982 and again in 1983, incorporates the proposals most
Congress authorizes an executive agency to enter into obligations. In this form, an
appropriation is made only when cash is needed to liquidate the obligation. Another
type of backdoor is loan authority where an agency is authorized to borrow funds
(usually from the Treasury) . . . . A third type of backdoors [sic] are mandatory
entitlements which usually are open-ended commitments by the United States to des-
ignated parties. The amount of the obligation depends on circumstances beyond the
immediate control of Congress such as the condition of the economy, the costs of
medical assistance, and the size of the welfare rolls.
Id at 23, reprinted at 3469.
6. Id at 24, reprinted at 3470-71. The committee noted that "[iln an average year, half or more
of the appropriation bills are awaiting action on July I (start of the fiscal year until 1976)."
As a result, the committee continued, "Congress has turned to continuing resolutions as a
means of funding Federal agencies and programs." The committee further explained that
continuing resolutions "expand the amount of uncertainty about spending" and "can gener-
ate inefficient spending tactics in agencies."
7. Id. at 25, reprinted at 3471.
8. Id. at 19-26, reprinted at 3466-72. See also BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 3, at 3-5.
9. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified at I U.S.C. § 105 (1982), 2 U.S.C. §§ 621-88
(1982), and scattered sections of 31 U.S.C. (1976)). Section 1 of the Act provides that titles I
through IX may be cited as the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 [hereinafter cited as
Budget Act], and Title X may be cited as the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, [hereinafter
cited as Impoundment Control Act].
10. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 2, 2 U.S.C. § 621 (1982).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 70-15 1.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 152-89.
13. In 1981 alone, nineteen bills were introduced in the Senate "which would radically revise in
one way or another the Budget Act." Hearings, supra note 4, at 40 (prepared statement of
Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M.). Also in 1982, the House Rules Committee Chairman ap-
pointed a sixteen member task force to study the budget process for the purpose of recom-
mending reforms. Id The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee held hearings on the
Budget Act in 1981 and on Senator Roth's bill (See S. 20, infra note 14) in 1982. See Hear-
ings, supra note 4.
14. S. 20, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. REC. S212 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983). The bill was
originally introduced in the second session of the 97th Congress as S. 2629, 128 CONG. REC.
S6799 (daily ed. June 15, 1982).
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likely to be discussed in any legislative effort to reform the budget pro-
cess. This note will summarize the Budget Act's congressional budget
process, consider deficiences therein, and analyze and critique Senate
Bill 20.
THE BUDGET ACT
Until 1976, each fiscal year began on July 1. Because Congress had
not been completing action on spending and revenue bills before the
start of the fiscal year,' 5 the Budget Act advanced the start of the fiscal
year to October 1, beginning with fiscal 1977.16 Following is a chrono-
logical summary of the Budget Act's timetable for congressional action
on the budget.
Preparation and Adoption of the First Budget Resolution
Submission of the President's Budget
Prior to 1921, the departments and agencies of the Federal Govern-
ment submitted their budget requests directly to Congress and simply
notified the President of their requests.' 7 In 1921, the Budget and Ac-
counting Act centralized authority to request funds for federal agencies
in the President and forbade federal agencies from directly seeking
funds from Congress.' 8 To aid the President in compiling his budget
requests, the Act established the Bureau of the Budget,' 9 renamed the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1970. 20 The Budget and
Accounting Act directed the President to submit the administration
budget to Congress on the first day of each regular session of
Congress. 2'
15. See HOUSE REPORT supra note 6 and accompanying text.
16. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 501, 31 U.S.C. § 1102 (1982 Supp.). The House Rules Commit-
tee stated that the "revised timetable . . . allows more time for the consideration of major
policy choices and substantially reduces the likelihood of continuing resolutions because of
failure to complete action on the appropriation bills before the start of the fiscal year."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 16, reprinted at 3463.
17. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 20-21, reprinted at 3467.
18. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, § 206, 42 Stat. 21 (current version at 2 U.S.C.
§ 1108 (1982 Supp.)).
19. Id § 207, 42 Stat. 22.
20. OMB, THE WORK OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 4 (May, 1982).
21. Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, ch. 18, § 201, 42 Stat. 20. Formulation of the Presi-
dent's budget begins nineteen months prior to the beginning of a fiscal year. For example,
assume that a fiscal year (FY-3) begins October 1 of Year-2. Preparation of the budget for
FY-3 would begin March 1 of Year-I. At that time, the President's senior economic advisors
would gather to review the economic outlook for current and future fiscal years. On the
basis of their conclusions, the President would then establish a general budget policy for FY-
3. In April and May, OMB would begin to implement the President's budget policy by
issuing guidelines to agencies for making their budget requests. During July and August, the
agencies would prepare their FY-3 budget requests for transmittal to OMB in September. In
September and October, the OMB staff would analyze the agency budgets and hold hearings
with agency officials. During October and November, the President's economic advisors
would meet to reconsider the economic outlook for FY-3 and the OMB Director would con-
sider the agency budget requests and decide on recommendations to the President. In De-
cember, the President would review the recommendations and decide on totals for agencies
and programs. Following preparation of budget documents by OMB, the President's budget
[Vol. 11:90
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The Budget Act of 1974 still required the President to submit his
budget proposal in January, but additionally required the President to
submit a current services budget in November of the previous year.22
The current services budget provides Congress with a statistical base
from which to estimate the budget authority and outlays23 needed to
continue existing programs at current statutory levels.24 As agreed
upon by Congress and the OMB, the President now submits the current
services budget in January in conjunction with his budget proposal.25
Budget Committee Hearings and Standing Committees' Estimates
During February and March of each year, the Budget Act directs
Congress to take three steps to prepare its first budget resolution. First,
both the House and Senate Budget Committees must hold hearings on
the budget for the upcoming fiscal year to receive testimony from mem-
bers of Congress, departmental and agency officials, and the general
public.2 6 Second, by March 15, each standing committee of Congress
must submit to the Budget Committee of its House "views and esti-
mates" on all matters within its jurisdiction which are pertinent to the
upcoming budget resolution.27 Finally, by April 1, the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) must submit to the Budget Committees a report
analyzing various budgetary alternatives available to Congress for the
upcoming fiscal year.28
Reporting and Adopting the First Budget Resolution
The House and Senate Budget Committees, utilizing the President's
budget requests, the CBO report, the reports of the standing commit-
tees, and their own hearings, must report a first concurrent resolution
on the budget ("first resolution") to their respective Houses of Congress
requests would be transmitted to Congress in January of Year-2 for the beginning of the
congressional budget process. See OMB, supra note 20, at 13-14.
22. Budget Act, supra note 9, at 22 § 605(a), 31 U.S.C. § 1109 (1982 Supp.). In 1950, Congress
changed the date of submission of the budget from the first day of each regular session of
Congress to any time during the first fifteen days. Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of
1950, ch. 946, § 102(a), 64 Stat. 832, (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (1982 Supp.)).
23. These terms are defined infra note 33.
24. BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 3, at I 11.
25. Id According to current OMB Director David Stockman, this change in the timetable
was made largely because OMB found the November submission took a lot of work
and the Congress did not find the November submission useful. The President's Jan-
uary budget was inevitably based on later information about the economy, actual
spending, and congressional action than the November submission. One of the main
uses of current services is to provide a yardstick against which to measure the Presi-
dent's budget proposals. A November submission does not provide the basis to do so.
Hearings, supra note 4, at 67 (response to written questions submitted by Sen. Roth, R-Del.).
26. Budget Act, supra note 9, at 301(d), 2 U.S.C. § 632(d) (1982). The Budget Committees of
Congress were created by Title I of the Budget Act.
27. Id at 301(c), 2 U.S.C. § 632(c) (1982).
28. Id at 202(0, 2 U.S.C. § 602(f) (1982). The Congressional Budget Office was created by Title
II of the Budget Act. Its primary function is to provide budgetary information to the Budget
Committees and other committees of Congress. It also provides its personnel to the Budget
Committees on a temporary basis. 1d at 202(a)-(d), 2 U.S.C. § 602(a)-(d) (1976).
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by April 15.29 Congress must then adopt a first resolution by May 15.30
The first resolution is a concurrent resolution of Congress which
does not require presidential approval. As such, it does not become
public law, but rather is a device Congress uses to govern its own
activities.
Pre-budget congressional procedures illustrate the need for the first
resolution. Prior to enactment of the Budget Act, Congress examined
programs and considered appropriations individually, so that it had
neither a coherent view of aggregate levels of federal spending nor a
view of how individual programs fit into those aggregate spending
levels.32- Consequently, the Budget Act now requires the Budget Com-
mittees to report resolutions to the House and Senate setting forth:
(1) appropriate levels of total budget authority and outlays; 33 (2) appro-
priate levels of new budget authority and estimated outlays for each
functional category; 34 (3) the anticipated budget surplus or deficit;35
(4) the recommended levels of federal revenue; 36 and (5) the appropri-
ate level of public debt.37 (See figure 1.)
29. Id at 301(d), 2 U.S.C. § 632(d) (1982).
30. Id § 301(a), 2 U.S.C. § 632(a) (1982).
31. CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
H.R. Doc. No. 398, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1981).
32. See Hearings, supra note 4.
33. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 301(a), 2 U.S.C. § 632(a) (1982). Budget authority as defined by
the Budget Act means "authority provided by law to enter into obligations which will result
in immediate or future outlays involving Governmental funds ... " Id § 3(a)(2), 2 U.S.C.
§ 622 (1982). Budget authority may take one of three basic forms. The first and most com-
mon type is an appropriation act which "permits federal agencies to incur obligations and to
make payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes." BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 3,
at 105. A second type is borrowing authority which "permits a Federal agency to incur
obligations and to make payments for specified purposes out of borrowed moneys." Id at
105-06. A third type of budget authority is contract authority, which permits obligations to
be incurred in advance of appropriations or in anticipation of receipts. Id at 106. Borrow-
ing authority and contract authority are sometimes referred to as types of backdoor author-
ity. See discussion, supra note 5.
Outlays are defined by the Budget Act as "expenditures and net lending of funds under
budget authority" during a given year. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 3(a)(l), 2 U.S.C. § 622
(1982). Outlays made during a given fiscal year may be for payment of obligations incurred
in prior years or in the current year. BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 3, at 123-24. Thus, out-
lays flow in part from unexpended balances of budget authority granted in prior years and in
part from budget authority provided for the year in which the money is spent. Id For exam-
ple, in fiscal year 1982, 63% of outlays were the result of budget authority granted in prior
years. Hearings, supra note 4, at 42 (prepared statement of Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M.).
34. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 301(a)(2), 2 U.S.C. § 632(a)(2) (1982). The federal budget is
classified by function so that budget authority, outlays and other budgetary items "can be
related in terms of the national needs being addressed." BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 3, at
117. There are 19 functional categories including headings such as national defense, interna-
tional affairs, general science, space and technology. Id at 20-30.
35. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 301(a)(3), 2 U.S.C. 632(a)(3) (1982).
36. Id § 301(a)(4), 2 U.S.C. 632(a)(4) (1982).
37. Id § 301(a)(5), 2 U.S.C. § 632(a)(5) (1982). The appropriate level of the public debt is to be
accompanied by "the amount, if any, by which the statutory limit on the public debt should
be increased or decreased by bills and resolutions to be reported by the appropriate commit-
tees .. ." Id House of Representatives Rule XLIX now links the public debt limit to the
budget process. Upon adoption by Congress of any concurrent resolution on the budget
which sets as the appropriate level of the public debt an amount different from the statutory
debt limit in effect for the period to which the budget resolution relates, House Rule XLIX
requires the House enrolling clerk to prepare a joint resolution increasing (or decreasing) the
Amending Congressional Budget Act
The primary function of the first resolution is to set targets for sub-
sequent congressional action on spending bills. The Budget Act there-
fore prohibits the House and Senate from considering any new
spending, revenue, or entitlement bills prior to adopting the first resolu-
tion."8 The first resolution is nonbinding, however, and only serves to
provide targets for later action on spending and revenue bills. Thus,
the resolution cannot be invoked to block consideration of bills which
would push aggregate spending or revenue above or below target
levels.39
To facilitate application of first resolution targets to action on
spending bills, the Budget Act provides, that in the joint statement of
the managers accompanying a first resolution's conference report, total
budget authority and total outlays are to be allocated among the appro-
priate House and Senate Committees.' These allocations are often
referred to as "302(a) allocations" since they are mandated by Section
302(a) of the Budget Act. (See figure 2.) Following these allocations,
the receiving committees make further allocations among their respec-
tive subcommittees in what are referred to as "302(b) allocations."41
Consequently, as Representative Leon Panetta (D-Cal.) has explained:
"When an appropriation bill comes to the floor we can determine
through the 302(b) allocations whether it breaches the ceilings set by
the first resolution. '"42
Congressional Action on Spending Bills
One of the basic divisions of legislative tasks in both Houses of
Congress is between the authorizing committees and the spending com-
mittees. Authorizing committees are those standing committees which
have jurisdiction over "the subject matter of those laws, or parts of
laws, that set up or continue the legal operations of federal programs or
agencies." 43  Spending committees are those standing committees
which have jurisdiction over "legislation that permits the obligation of
funds."44 The House and Senate Appropriations Committees serve as
the spending committees for most federal programs. 45 For some pro-
debt limit by an amount equal to the difference between the current limit and the appropriate
limit specified by the budget resolution. The joint resolution is deemed to have passed the
House by the vote by which the House adopted the conference report on the budget and is
transmitted to the Senate for action.
38. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 303, 2 U.S.C. § 634 (1982). This prohibition does not apply to
budget authority or revenue changes which would become effective after the fiscal year to
which the concurrent resolution applies. The Act also provides for waiver of this provision
by the Senate in certain circumstances. Id
39. But see infra text accompanying notes 146-7 for a description of the fiscal 1982 budget pro-
cess when the first resolution became the second, binding resolution.
40. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 302(a), 2 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1982). But see infra text accompanying
notes 146-147.
41. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 302(b), 2 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1982).
42. Hearings, supra note 4, at 176 (statement of Rep. Leon Panetta, D-Cal.).
43. BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 3, at 103.




grams, however, the authorizing committee also serves as the spending
committee because the legislation itself provides budget authority in
the form of permanent appropriations, borrowing authority, or contract
authority.16 This longstanding dichotomy in legislative functions en-
ables Congress:
[t]o respond to confficting pressures to guard the Treasury and to
finance government programs. The authorizing committees generally
behave as advocates; their job is to assess the needs of programs within
their jurisdiction, not to tend to the overall fiscal condition of the
United States. The principal role of the Appropriation Committees is
to guard against spending.47
Before a program can be funded by an appropriation committee, in
most cases, it must be legislatively approved by an authorizing commit-
tee. 48 The Budget Act provides that all legislation authorizing new
budget authority, with the exception of entitlement bills and social se-
curity legislation, must be reported out of authorizing committees by
May 15, the same deadline set for congressional adoption of the first
resolution.49 Failure to report authorizing legislation by May 15 sub-
jects the legislation to a point of order.50
The Budget Act allows Congress almost four months from the time
when the first resolution is adopted and the authorizing legislation is
reported to enact its spending bills.5' Congress must complete action on
all new budget authority and new entitlement bills by the seventh day
after Labor Day.52 The Act requires all budget authority bills reported
during this four month period to compare the proposed amounts of
new budget authority with the relevant figures in the first resolution,
and to project outlays for a five year period based on the proposed
budget authority.53 Furthermore, the Act directs the CBO to provide
Congress with periodic "scorekeeping" reports comparing congres-
sional action with the first resolution.54
46. Id
47. Hearings, supra note 4, at 79 (prepared statement of Sen. Mark Hatfield, R-Or., quoting
Allen Schick).
48. "No appropriation shall be reported in any general appropriation bill or shall be in order as
an amendment thereto, for any expenditure not previously authorized by law, except to con-
tinue appropriations for public works and objects which are already in progress." Rules of
the House of Representatives, Rule XXI, cl. 2. "[N]o amendments shall be received to any
general appropriation bill the effect of which will be to increase an appropriation already
contained in the bill, or to add a new item of appropriation, unless it be made to carry out the
provisions of some existing law. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, Rule XVI, cl. 1,
98th Cong., 1st Sess.
49. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 402(a)-(c), 2 U.S.C. § 652 (1982). However, the Act does waive
this rule in certain situations.
50. Id
51. Id § 300, 2 U.S.C. § 631 (1982).
52. Id § 309, 2 U.S.C. § 640 (1982).
53. Id § 308(a), 2 U.S.C. § 639(a) (1982).
54. Id § 308(b), 2 U.S.C. § 639(b) (1982).
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Adopting the Second Budget Resolution and Reconciliation
The Budget Act provides for adoption of a second concurrent
budget resolution ("second resolution") following completion of action
on spending bills.55 The second resolution, slated for adoption no later
than September 15,56 either "reaffirms or revises" the first resolution in
accordance with changes in economic circumstances and outlook at
late summer.57 Functionally, the second resolution differs from the first
resolution in two ways: (1) the second resolution is binding on both
Houses of Congress, and (2) the second resolution may initiate a legis-
lative process known as "reconciliation."
The second resolution is binding in the sense that legislation which
would cause the resolution's level of total budget authority or outlays
to be exceeded is subject to a point of order.58 Additionally, legislation
reducing total revenues below the levels set in the second resolution is
subject to a point of order.59 The second resolution's binding effect
applies only to aggregate levels, and not to spending levels set for indi-
vidual budget functions.60
Reconciliation is the Budget Act's response to the possibility that
congressional action during the summer may not agree entirely with
the second resolution which is adopted.6' For example, if congres-
sional spending bills exceed the resolution's total levels of budget au-
thority or outlays, or if new projections show that revenues will not
meet the targeted levels, Congress may direct specific committees to
reconcile the discrepancies by September 25.62 The "reconciliation in-
55. Id § 310, 2 U.S.C. § 641 (1982).
56. Id. § 310(b), 2 U.S.C. § 641(b) (1982).
57. Id § 310(a), 2 U.S.C. § 641(a) (1982). The Senate Rules and Administration Committee
Report accompanying S. 1541, the original Senate version of the Budget Act detailed the
purpose of the second resolution:
The [second resolution] is to be the vehicle for reassessment of the actions Congress
has taken to date (as well as actions not yet completed but which appear probable and
which will affect the budget picture in the ensuing fiscal year) in light of the latest
estimates relating to the state of the economy, revenues, outlays and other relevant
variables. It will set forth revised or reaffirmed allocations by function as well as
revised or reaffirmed totals so that when and if, during that budget year, Congress
must consider a measure or measures providing additional new budget authority for
such year it will be possible to compare the budget authority contained in such meas-
ures with the appropriate level of total new budget authority and the recommended
allocation of new budget authority by function as set forth in the budget resolution
adopted most recently. It will, in other words, be possible to determine whether any
particular bill providing additional budget authority for the then-current year (such as
a supplemental appropriation) was anticipated and planned for. Thus, the same disci-
pline achieved through the guidelines in and comparison with the initial budget reso-
lution will obtain through the fiscal year itself by virtue of the guidelines in and
continued comparison with the second required budget resolution (or any later budget
resolution that may have been enacted).
S. REP. No. 688, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3504, 3551-52.
58. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 311(a), 2 U.S.C. § 642(a) (1982).
59. Id
60. Id
61. Id. § 310(c)-(e), 2 U.S.C. § 641(c)-(e) (1982).
62. Id. § 310(c), 2 U.S.C. § 641(c) (1982).
Journal of Legislation
structions" included in the second resolution would direct committees
to recommend changes in laws, bills, and resolutions within their juris-
diction in an attempt to reach a specified amount of savings or in-
creased revenues.63 The instructions may specify dollar amounts, but
may not specify the programs to be effected. (See figure 3.)
Subsequent Resolutions
The Conference Report on the Budget Act states:
The managers anticipate that there will be instances in which Congress
may deem it appropriate to revise its earlier spending or revenue deter-
minations. But such revisions should be made in the context of the
congressional budget process and with full awareness of their relation-
ship to the levels set forth in the latest budget resolution.'
Pursuant to these objectives, the Budget Act provides that previous
budget resolutions may be revised during a fiscal year.65 The managers
of the Conference Report expected that at least one additional budget
resolution revising the second resolution would be necessary each year
to reflect updated figures for the current fiscal year, or the enactment of
supplemental appropriations for particular agencies.66
Enforcement of the Budget Act
The Budget Act states that it is "enacted by the Congress as an exer-
cise of the rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the
Senate, respectively. ' ' 67 The Act therefore affirms the constitutional
right of either House to change the Budget Act provisions insofar as
they relate to that House of Congress.68 Furthermore, the Act explic-
itly affirms the right of the Senate to waive or suspend any of the
Budget Act provisions. 69 Thus, Congress' failure to abide by the provi-
sions of the budget process does not violate the law. Consequently, the
success of the process ultimately rests on Congress' willingness to ob-
serve the self-imposed requirements of the Budget Act.
THE BUDGET ACT IN OPERATION
Application: 1976-1982
1976: First Full Application of the Budget Act
"Congress has designed a new budget system that works," said
Chairman Edmund Muskie (D-Me.) of the Senate Budget Committee,
63. Id § 310(a), 2 U.S.C. § 641(a) (1982).
64. S. CONF. REP. No. 924, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 64, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3591, 3606 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT].
65. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 304, 2 U.S.C. § 635 (1982).
66. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 64, at 61, reprinted at 3603.
67. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 904(a), 2 U.S.C.A. § 621 (1982).
68. Id Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: "Each House may determine the Rules
of its Proceedings .. "
69. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 904(b), 2 U.S.C.A. § 621 (1982).
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regarding Congress' preparation of the fiscal 1977 federal budget. "We
can make and enforce the hard choices necessary to achieve fiscal disci-
pline and a balanced budget in the foreseeable future. . . and pursue a
fiscal plan to restore vigor to our economy. '"70
Muskie's optimism about the future of the new budget process did
indeed seem to be justified, based on Congress' initial close adherence
to the self-imposed mandates of the Budget Act. Congress passed the
first budget resolution on May 13,71 two days before the deadline, and
the second resolution on September 16,72 only one day after the dead-
line. More impressive than its close adherence to the deadlines was
that the budgetary levels set in the second resolution differed little from
the target figures set in the first resolution.73 This has been attributed
to the accuracy of the economic projections underlying the first resolu-
tion and the committees' close adherence to the first resolution targets
when drafting their spending bills.74  The only deviation from Con-
gress' close adherence to the Budget Act in preparing for fiscal 1977
was the necessity on October 1, 1976 of enacting a continuing resolu-
tion 75 to provide temporary funding for several categories of health,
education, and jobs programs for which regular fiscal 1977 appropria-
tions had not yet been enacted.76
Fiscal year 1977 demonstrated, however, that the "binding" levels
70. 1976 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 673.
71. S. Con. Res. 109, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 CONG. REC. 13756 (1976). As an illustration of
how the Budget Act enabled Congress to play a decisive role in formulation of the federal
budget, consider the following summation which appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL QUAR-
TERLY ALMANAC:
The policies outlined in the May targets and upheld by the second resolution differed
significantly from those proposed by [President] Ford in his January budget message.
The congressional budget called for more federal spending for a greater stimulus to
the economy, with small reductions in federal taxes on businesses and individuals.
Congress rejected many of Ford's proposals for cutbacks and consolidations in do-
mestic programs, and it targeted much of the increase in federal spending for an as-
sortment of jobs programs to combat high unemployment. One area where Congress
and the White House agreed was on increased defense spending, with the Defense
Department getting virtually all Ford had requested.
1976 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 673. The first resolution also included binding targets for the July
I-September 30, 1976 transition quarter. Id
72. S. Con. Res. 139, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 30433 (1976).
73. 1976 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 673.
74. Id
75. A continuing resolution is:
[LIegislation enacted by Congress to provide budget authority for Federal agencies to
continue in operation until the regular appropriations are enacted. Continuing reso-
lutions are enacted when action on appropriations is not completed by the beginning
of a fiscal year. The continuing resolution usually specifies a maximum rate at which
the obligations may be incurred, based on the rate of the prior year, the President's
budget request, or an appropriation bill passed by either or both houses of Congress.
BUDGET PROCESS, Supra note 3, at 106. A continuing resolution is a joint resolution of Con-
gress, and is "treated exactly the same as ... [a] numbered bill. Except for constitutional
amendments, it also must be approved by the President. The traditional use of. . .[a joint
resolution] is to either change a minor item in an existing law or handle a matter of urgency
which requires speedy action." MANUAL ON LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED
STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE REPUBLI-
CAN LEADER) 89 (January 1982) [hereinafter cited as REPUBLICAN MANUAL].
76. H.R. Res. 1105, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); 1976 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 789.
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of a second budget resolution could easily succumb to changes in eco-
nomic policy. Early in 1977 Congress adopted an unprecedented third
budget resolution,77 raising the binding levels of the second resolution
to accommodate an economic stimulus program requested by President
Carter.7" Later that spring, after President Carter had revised his stim-
ulus plan,7 9 Congress incorporated in the first resolution for fiscal
19788 a fourth set of fiscal 1977 budget totals.
1979. Policy Di#-erences Strain the Process
In the words of a commentator, "[the] fiscal 1980 budget was con-
ceived in inflation, nurtured in the politics of the balanced budget, and
born on the edge of recession.""' With the beginnings of our current
economic recession on the horizon, ideological differences on how best
to deal with the economy caused the first serious breach of the new
budget process. The first resolution,8 2 adopted "after a long and ardu-
ous battle," only missed the May 15 deadline by nine days.83 But Con-
gress' deviations from the new process grew more severe.
By the beginning of fiscal 1980, the second resolution was not close
to passage and work on ten out of thirteen regular appropriations bills
had not been completed.84 Congress was forced to adopt continuing
resolutions on October 1285 and again on November 1686 to provide
paychecks for federal workers. Congress finally passed its second
budget resolution on November 28,87 fifty-nine days after the begin-
ning of the fiscal year and seventy-four days after the deadline set by
the Budget Act.88
1980. Deviation Continues But Modified Reconciliation Is Invoked
Faced with high inflation, a deepening recession, and the rising tide
of political conservatism,89 Congress missed the first resolution dead-
line by almost a month in its efforts to forge a balanced budget9" for
77. S. Con. Res. 10, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 6053 (1977).
78. House Budget Committee Chairman Robert N. Giamo (D-Conn.) explained the economic
circumstances which necessitated the revision of the fiscal 1977 budget levels: "[The] ex-
traordinary economic slowdown of the past six months has made [a third resolution] neces-
sary. Nearly everyone agrees that additional economic stimulus measures are needed, and
those measures cannot be accommodated within the now out-of-date revenue floor and
spending ceilings set in the September resolution." 1977 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 97.
79. S. Con. Res. 19, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 15126 (1977).
80. 1977 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 189.
81. 1979 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 163.
82. H. Con. Res. 107, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 11987 (1979).
83. 1979 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 163.
84. Id at 275.
85. H.J. Res. 412, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 28103 (1979).
86. H.J. Res. 440, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 32861 (1979).
87. S. Con. Res. 53, 96th Cong., Ist Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 32962 (1979).
88. 1979 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 163.
89. Inflation had risen to an annualized rate of 18.2% in January, 1980. 1980 CONG. Q. ALMA-
NAC at 107. See generally id at 271-72.
90. The first resolution predicted a surplus of $200 million. Id at 107.
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fiscal 1981. The first resolution was finally adopted June 12,9' but as a
commentator said, "many lawmakers approved the controversial
budget for procedural rather than philosophic reasons." '9 By the time
the resolution was adopted, the economy had begun to slide into reces-
sion, making the resolution's prediction of a balanced budget unrealis-
tic.93 Thus, Senate Budget Committee Member Pete Domenici (R-
N.M.) observed: "This budget is only technically in balance. 94
Despite Congress' apparent lack of discipline in adopting a first res-
olution on schedule, Congress showed a determination to be fiscally
disciplined by invoking the reconciliation process, for the first time, to
achieve spending reductions. Rather than incorporating the reconcilia-
tion instructions in the second resolution as provided by the Budget
Act, Congress included the instructions in the first resolution.95 No il-
legality resulted from this deviation from the Budget Act, however, be-
cause Congress may at any time alter the budget process through its
rulemaking powers. 9'
The objective of the reconciliation instructions was to produce a
balanced federal budget for fiscal 1981.9' The first resolution directed
eight House and ten Senate committees to recommend changes in laws
within their jurisdiction which would result in savings of $4.95 billion
in budget authority, savings of $6.4 billion in outlays, and a $4.2 billion
increase in revenues.98 Following the largest conference in the history
of Congress, involving more than one hundred conferees and lasting
two months, Congress passed the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980
on December 3.99 As estimated, the reconciliation changes saved ap-
proximately $3.1 billion in budget authority and $4.7 billion in outlays,
and produced $3.6 billion in additional revenues.'0°
The reconciliation spending cuts were in entitlement programs.' O'
Entitlements refer to "spending authority . . . to make payments...
91. H. Con. Res. 307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 44204 (daily ed. May 22, 1980).
92. 1980 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 108. Rep. David R. Obey, D-Wis., urged his colleagues to support
the resolution on grounds that "we have to lay to rest one stage of the budget resolution and
move on to another stage." Id
93. Id at 109.
94. Id
95. Id at 125.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
97. 1980 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 125.
98. BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 3, at 13.
99. H.R. 7765, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 11687 (1980).
100. BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 3, at 13.
101. 1980 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 125. Representative Leon Panetta, D-Cal., Chairman of the
House Budget Committee's Reconciliation Task Force, observed:
[Flederal programs can be divided into two categories: direct spending programs,
basically entitlements, and programs which require yearly appropriations. The differ-
ence between these two types of programs is that the appropriated programs are ex-
amined by Congress every year through the appropriations process, while the direct
spending programs are not required to be reviewed at all. Reconciliation is ideal for
direct spending programs because it forces committees to conduct some sort of review
of these programs for effectiveness and efficiency, with an eye towards cutting
spending.
Hearings, supra note 4, at 175-76 (statement of Rep. Leon Panetta).
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the budget authority for which is not provided for in advance by appro-
priation acts, to any person or government if, under the provisions of
the law containing such authority, the United States is obligated to
make such payments to persons or governments who meet the require-
ments established by law."' °2 Examples of entitlements include Social
Security benefits and veterans' compensation. Because entitlement re-
cipients, if denied funding, may sue in court to receive their entitlement
payments, Congress must either permanently appropriate funds for
such programs or make sufficient annual appropriations to meet pro-
jected costs. 0 3
When fiscal 1981 began on October 1, 1980, Congress had com-
pleted action on only three of the thirteen regular appropriations
bills. 'I Consequently, Congress began fiscal 1981 by passing a contin-
uing resolution which extended spending authority for federal agencies
to December 15, 1980.105 Passage of the continuing resolution was ur-
gent because early in 1980 Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti had
ruled that when budget authority runs out for federal programs, only
functions that protect life and property and those necessary for winding
down federal activities may legally continue. 106 On December 15,
1981, five appropriation bills had still not yet been enacted. 0 7 Never-
102. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 401(c)(2)(C), 2 U.S.C. § 651(c)(2)(C) (1982).
103. BUDGET PROCESS, supra note 3, at 115.
104. 1980 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 169. Two of the three bills were not actually passed until the first
day of the fiscal year. Therefore, technically only one bill had been passed when fiscal 1981
began.
105. H.J. Res. 610, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 10146 (1980). There was a short hiatus
in federal funding when fiscal 1981 began. The continuing resolution was not passed until
noon on October 1 and President Carter did not sign it until 4 p.m. that afternoon-sixteen
hours after the Federal Government technically ran out of money. However, there were no
significant effects on government operations. 1980 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 169.
106. 1980 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 169. Funding had run out for the Federal Trade Commission,
which was forced to shut down for one day on May 1, 1980. Id. at 233. Faced with the
prospect of a shutdown, Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti on April 25 issued legal
guidelines for lapses in funding, based on an 1870 Act of Congress. Section 7 of that Act
states that:
it shall not be lawful for any department of the government to expend in any one
fiscal year any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress for that fiscal year,
or to involve the government in any contract for the future payment of money in
excess of such appropriations.
Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 251. (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 665(a) (1976)).
Civiletti's April 25 guidelines provided that agencies must begin an orderly shutdown in the
absence of appropriations and that violations of the shutdown would be prosecuted. How-
ever, in a memorandum dated January 16, 1981, Civiletti eased the guidelines stating that
"[t]he Constitution and the Antideficiency Act itself leave the executive leeway to perform
essential functions and make the government 'workable.'" 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 298.
The Antideficiency Act amended the 1870 Act of Congress by providing: "Nor shall any
Department or any officer of the Government accept voluntary service for the Government
or employ personal services in excess of that authorized by law," except in cases of sudden
emergency involving the loss of human life or the destruction of property. Act of March 3,
1906, ch. 511, 34 Stat. 49. (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982 Supp.).
107. 1980 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 176, 197, 210, 222, 227. The five appropriations categories were
legislative, foreign aid, state-justice-commerce, labor-HHS-education, and treasury-postal.
Congress had passed a state-justice-commerce appropriations bill which President Carter
had vetoed on December 13, because it "contained a provision preventing the Justice De-
partment from bringing lawsuits that could lead to court-ordered school busing for desegre-
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theless, the hiatus in funding for the affected agencies lasted only a few
hours; Congress passed a second continuing resolution for fiscal 1981
on December 16.118
1981. 'Reaganomics," Reconciliation, and Continuing Resolutions
Ironically, the evolution of the congressional budget process in 1981
resulted more from presidential action than congressional action. Hav-
ing swept into office on a political mandate to balance the federal
budget, President Reagan asked Congress in January to cut $41.4 bil-
lion from President Carter's final budget proposals.'0 9 David Stock-
man, the new OMB Director, proposed using the reconciliation process
which had been used on a small scale the previous year to achieve the
desired cuts in federal spending." ° By consolidating the cuts into a
single reconciliation package, the Administration "hoped to prevent
congressional committees and interest groups from chipping away at
the president's budget plan.""' After incorporating reconciliation in-
structions into the first resolution" 2 adopted on May 21, 1981, Con-
gress passed the Onmibus Reconciliation Bill of 1981 on July 31 of that
year. 113
Reconciliation in 1981 was notable for several reasons. First, the
reconciliation bill was massive in scope. 114 Whereas the fiscal 1981 rec-
onciliation procedure had cut an estimated $4.7 billion from federal
outlays," l5 the fiscal 1982 procedure cut an estimated $35.2 billion from
outlays. 116
Second, the reconciliation instructions required committees to re-
port legislation designed to impact over a three-year period." 7 Repre-
sentative Leon Panetta (D-Cal.), Chairman of the House Budget
Committee's Reconciliation Task Force, complained that those instruc-
tions left "committees in a quandary over how to achieve cuts in pro-
grams they had traditionally authorized for only one or two years." 1" 8
Although the Budget Committee and the authorization committees re-
solved these problems, Panetta argued that "the confusion created al-
ation." Id at 210. However, the spending provisions of the vetoed bill were included in the
ecember 16 continuing resolution. Id.
108. H.J. Res. 644, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. H12542 (1980).
109. 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 245.
110. Id at 256.
111. Id at 245.
112. H. Con. Res. 115, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 2413 (1981).
113. H.R. 3982, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 5758 (1981).
114. House Budget Committee Chairman James R. Jones, D-Okla., referred to the reconciliation
bill as "clearly the most monumental and historic turn-around in fiscal policy that has ever
occurred." 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 256.
115. See figures cited, supra text accompanying note 100.
116. 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 245. "Outlays" in this context refers to the amount they would
have been if fiscal 1981 services had been extended into fiscal 1982 and adjusted for inflation.
117. Id. at 257. The final version of the reconciliation bill provided for an estimated $130.6 bil-
lion in savings for fiscal years 1982-84. Id.
118. Hearings, supra note 4, at 177 (statement of Rep. Leon Panetta).
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most brought the reconciliation process to a halt."'" 9 However, Alice
Rivlin, Director of the CBO, asserted that the multiyear reconciliation
instructions "enhanc[ed] the effectiveness of the multiyear targets con-
tained in the first resolution."' 20
Third, committees were instructed to recommend changes in au-
thorizing legislation, in addition to changes in entitlements.' 2' In its
final form, the sweeping Reconciliation Act of 1981 included provisions
to:
[tlighten income eligibility for food stamps and public assistance, elim-
inate minimum Social Security benefits, cut funds requested for subsi-
dized housing programs, reduce school lunch subsidies, institute a
needs test for guaranteed student loans, cut federal Medicaid payments
to the states .. .consolidate various health and education programs
into block grants . . . establish a framework for ending Conrail subsi-
dies, provide longer terms for radio and TV licenses, reauthorize the
Consumer Products Safety Commission, terminate public service em-
ployment programs, limit pay raises for federal workers, [and] increase
interest rates in lending programs for farmers and small
businesses . . 22
A final noteworthy aspect of the 1981 reconciliation procedure was
the speed with which this legislation was drafted. 23 After Congress
adopted the reconciliation instructions, House Committees were given
just over three weeks to report more than $35 billion in budget cuts. 24
The reconciliation conference was of unusually short duration.
Whereas House and Senate conferees had spent over six weeks working
out differences over an estimated $4.7 billion in outlay reductions, in
1981, the conferees settled budget cuts totaling more than $35 billion in
119. Id. at 178.
120. Id. at 138 (prepared statement of Director Alice Rivlin).
121. Id at 78 (prepared statement of Sen. Mark Hatfield, R-Or.). Senator Hatfield explained the
application of reconciliation to authorizations:
Another unprecedented step taken this year was the requirement that legislative
committees reduce authorization levels. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the
Committee on Conference on the Budget Act stated that the authorization of budget
authority was beyond the reach of the Budget Committees. But because this language
applied only to a first concurrent resolution, and the resolution in question was tech-
nically the third budget resolution for fiscal year 1981, such action by the Budget
Committee was permitted.
I might add that the House Budget Committee did not adopt this same approach.
The concurrent resolution reported by that Committee direced [sic] legislative com-
mittees only to make reductions in the direct spending programs within their jurisdic-
tion. The argument of that committee was that the actual spending level for
authorized programs is set in the appropriation, rather than authorization act. How-
ever, the Gramm-Latta substitute offered on the House floor also contained authori-
zation reductions, and with the acceptance of that substitute, the survival of
instructions to reduce multi-year authorizations was assured. Incidentally, on the
House floor, this instruction was termed "an astounding usurpation of the function of
the legislative committees . . . and way beyond the authority of the Budget Act."
Id at 78-79.
122. 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 256.
123. Id. at 257.
124. Hearings, supra note 4, at 184 (statement of Rep. Leon Panetta, D-Cal.).
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fifteen days.' 25 Some congressmen argued that this summary process
breached legislative responsibility because it left very little time avail-
able for hearings, staff study, and debate. 26 Others argued, however,
that the conference produced a well-drafted bill. 127
Throughout the latter half of 1981, Congress passed a series of con-
tinuing resolutions. On September 24, President Reagan announced
his desire for an additional $13 billion in budget cuts and an additional
$3 billion in revenues.' 28 Opposition within his own party to this new
initiative delayed the enactment of spending bills.' 2 9 When fiscal 1982
began on October 1, none of the thirteen regular appropriation bills
had been enacted.' 30 Thus, Congress was forced to adopt a continuing
resolution to fund the government through November 20, 1982.'3'
In early November, since only one of the regular appropriations
bills had been enacted, 132 Congress drafted another continuing resolu-
tion to avoid a government shutdown. Dissatisfied with its savings
measures, President Reagan vetoed the resolution. 13  At midnight, on
Friday, November 20, 1982, the government technically ran out of
money. 34 Pursuant to a 1980 ruling by the Attorney General, the Fed-
eral Government began shutting down on Monday, November 23,
198 1,135 in the first broadly-based federal shutdown.136 Later that day,
Congress approved an emergency continuing resolution which ex-
tended funding through December 15.137 A third continuing resolution
for fiscal 1982 was passed by Congress on December 11. 138 The resolu-
tion provided funding through March 30, 1983 for programs covered
under the three appropriation bills that had still not been enacted by
125. 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 257.
126. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 4, at 174 (statement of Rep. Leon Panetta).
127. 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 257.
128. Id at 267.
129. Id at 245.
130. See id at 245-380. However, a full-year legislative branch appropriation was included in the
October 1 continuing resolution. Id at 286.
131. H.J. Res. 325, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H6698 (1981).




135. Based on the Attorney General's January 16, 1981 memo (see BUDGET PROCESS, supra note
3, at 115), OMB administered the November 23 shutdown in the following way. Generally,
all government functions were to cease. Exempted from the shutdown were: presidential
activities dealing with national security and foreign relations, government activities funded
by multi-year appropriations or authorized by law to operate in advance of appropriations,
and activities involving the safety of human life or the protection of property. (The latter
exemption is based on 2 U.S.C § 1342 (1982 Supp.)). As for employees engaged in non-
exempted activities, President Reagan decreed that furloughs should be handed out "as soon
as possible." However, the furloughs proceeded at varying paces depending on the agency,
and some agencies did not wind down at all during the one-day shutdown. 1981 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 298-99.
136. The Federal Trade Commission had been forced to shut down for one day, and again for
two days, in 1980. 1980 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 233.
137. H.J. Res. 368, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 8828 (1981).




The second budget resolution for fiscal 1982140 was adopted on De-
cember 10, 1981, nearly three months after the deadline. The resolu-
tion failed to reflect the country's worsening economic conditions, and
was simply aproforma affirmation of the first resolution.' The sec-
ond resolution in fiscal 1982 proved in fact to be unrealistic. By the
spring of 1982, federal spending had exceeded the aggregate budget
totals established by the second resolution. 42 During that spring Con-
gress faced a dilemma: federal programs were nearly out of money and
needed supplemental appropriations, yet Congress realized that any
new spending bills would breach the second resolution aggregate
spending limits, and subject the legislation to a point of order. Con-
gress therefore revised the fiscal 1982 second budget resolution in its
first budget resolution for fiscal 1983.143
1982: Difficulty Adopting a First Resolution and Abandoning the
Second Resolution
With the deepening recession and deficit projections of more than a
hundred billion dollars, in the spring of 1982'" Congress faced a great
deal of political pressure while it worked on its first fiscal 1983 budget
resolution. The House of Representatives rejected eight budget pro-
posals before finally adopting a first resolution on June 23, 1982.145
A distinctive feature of the 1983 first resolution provided that it
would automatically become the binding second resolution if Congress
failed to adopt a second resolution by October 1.146 This provision
became effective when Congress, amid an election year and an eco-
nomic recession, chose to avoid a politically explosive battle over the
second resolution. 147
The fiscal 1983 reconciliation procedures instituted by the House of
Representatives also distinguished the 1983 budget process from that of
previous years. 148 Despite the Budget Act's mandate to consider all
139. The three appropriations categories still not funded were labor-HHS-education, state-justice-
commerce, and treasury-post office. 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 244, 246.
140. S. Con. Res. 50, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 CONG. REC. H9192 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1981).
141. 181 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 267. The resolution affirmed the first resolution figures which had
estimated a combined $57 billion deficit for fiscal 1982 and 1983 and a slight surplus for
1984, estimates which were "totally out of line" with projections being made at the time the
second resolution was adopted. Id
142. 1982 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 861.
143. S. REP. No. 478, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982).
144. 1982 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 660, 2718.
145. S. Con. Res. 92, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 7318 (1982) and 1982 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 1243.
146. S. Con. Res. 92, § 7, supra n. 145. This same procedure was incorporated in the budget reso-
lution for fiscal 1984. H. Con. Res. 91, § 5(a), 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
147. 1982 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 242.
148. Congress passed the fiscal 1983 reconciliation bill, H.R. 6955, on August 18. The bill pro-
vided for an estimated $13.3 billion in spending cuts over three years, much less than the
previous year's cuts which totaled an estimated $130.6 billion for fiscal years 1982-1984.
1982 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 2047.
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reconciliation items in a single bill, the House of Representatives voted
to consider federal pension spending cuts separately from other fiscal
1983 budget reductions.' 49 House Democrats argued that the change
would allow the public to see how House members voted on each of the
proposed budget cuts and would prevent surreptitious changes in au-
thorization laws. 150 In contrast to the House Democrats, House Minor-
ity Leader Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.) asserted that the Democrats'
action was designed "to embarrass and frustrate those in this House
who supported the budget resolution in June."'15 1
Status of the Budget Process
Budget Resolutions
Congress has had more success in meeting the first budget resolu-
tion deadline than the second resolution deadline (See Figure 4.) Of
the nine first resolutions adopted by Congress, two resolutions have
been passed on time and four have been acted upon within nine days
after the deadline. In 1980, 1982, and 1983, the May 15 deadline was
significantly breached. 5 2 Congress has been increasingly dilatory in
meeting the September 15 deadline for the second resolution. In 1976,
1977, and 1978, Congress adhered to the deadline fairly closely. Dur-
ing this period, the greatest delay was in 1978, when Congress exceeded
the deadline by eight days.1 53 In 1979 and 1980, however, Congress
missed the second resolution deadline by over two months, and in
1981, by almost three months. 54 In 1982 and 1983, Congress aban-
doned the second resolution altogether. 155
Congressional committees' submission of "views and estimates" on
the upcoming fiscal year by March 15 has proved ineffective in aiding
the Budget Committees' preparation of the first budget resolution.
Noting the "unreasonably short period of time after the session
starts" 156 to prepare the views and estimates, Senate Budget Committee
Chairman Domenici observed:
Since it is nothing more than a recommendation, few official hearings
are now held by the committees nor do the committees make any real
in-depth analyses to support their recommendations. I regret to say the
end product has turned out just to be something procedurally you must
have but for the most part it is ignored.' 57
The importance accorded the first resolution now exceeds that of
the second resolution. The delays in adopting the resolution, the pro
149. Id at 1809.
150. Id
151. Id
152. See infra figure 4.
153. Id
154. Id.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
156. Hearings, supra note 4, at 38 (testimony of Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M.).
157. Id at 39.
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forma second resolution for fiscal 1982, and the decision to abandon
the second resolution for fiscal 1983 and fiscal 1984, 58 exemplify the
second resolution's decline in importance. In the opinion of CBO Di-
rector Rivlin, the relative preeminence of the first resolution is easily
explained since:
[tihe major budgetary issues facing the Congress each year must be
hammered out in the first resolution. By the time the second resolution
is considered, the Congress is much too close to . . .the start of the
fiscal year to decide any important questions. 159
For this reason, in Rivlin's view, reconciliation instructions have been
included in the first resolution for the past three years.160 One Senator
has argued that inclusion of reconciliation instructions in the first reso-
lution has, in effect, converted the first resolution's non-binding targets
into binding ceilings to which congressional authorizing and spending
committees must conform their actions.
16 1
A final noteworthy aspect of the budget resolution is that no legisla-
tion has yet been subjected to a point of order for breaching the bind-
ing second resolution. 62 Several factors may account for this. First,
and most importantly, the Budget Act allows for subsequent budget
resolutions to revise the second resolution. 163 Subsequent resolutions
have been adopted in five fiscal years. 164 Second, spending shortfalls
may, to some extent, have provided leeway within the budget aggre-
gates for spending measures which would otherwise have been sub-
jected to a point of order. 165 Third, the Budget Act conveniently places
the binding resolution after Congress takes action on spending bills.
Thus, as recounted by the House Republican Manual, "the second res-
olution has become an 'adding up' exercise wherein the measures
adopted over the summer are added together to arrive at the 'appropri-
ate' levels in the second resolution."'' 66
Reconciliation
Aptly summing up the evolution of reconciliation, Senator Mark
Hatfield (R-Or.), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
stated:
From a last gasp mechanism designed to bring spending within con-
gressional ceilings just a week prior to the beginning of a new fiscal
year, reconciliation has been converted to the preeminent device to es-
tablish budget levels in advance. 167
158. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41, 146-47; see infra figure 4.
159. Hearings, supra note 4, at 139 (prepared statement of Director Alice Rivlin).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96, 109-13, 148-51.
161. Hearings, supra note 4, at (opening statement of Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich.).
162. REPUBLICAN MANUAL, supra note 75, at 242.
163. Budget Act, supra note 9, § 304, 2 U.S.C. § 635 (1982).
164. In 1977, 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1983, Reconciliation Bills were adopted. See infra figure 4.
165. REPUBLICAN MANUAL, supra note 75, at 242.
166. Id
167. Hearings, supra note 4, at 78 (prepared statement of Sen. Mark Hatfield, R-Or.).
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The reconciliation procedure gained preeminence when its position in
the congressional budget process shifted. As a brief procedure follow-
ing the second resolution, reconciliation could only have been a proce-
dure of primarily technical utility. 68 As a procedure initiated by the
first resolution, reconciliation has become a vehicle for major restruc-
turing of government programs. 69
During the past three years, the use of reconciliation as a vehicle for
major legislative changes has produced mixed reactions. Some Con-
gressmen have complained vigorously about the summary way in
which scores of substantive changes in federal programs have been
made. Referring to the mammoth reconciliation effort of 1981, Con-
gressman Jamie Whitten (D-Miss.), Chairman of the House Appropria-
tions Committee, said:
Reconciliation sets a very dangerous precedent for the legislative com-
mittees to be required to set aside the public review process in very
complex issues. The Congress rushed through a bill that affected pro-
grams two or three years down the road without even an opportunity
to fully understand its effects. . . . How far we have come from the
intent of the Budget Act. 7 '
Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman, architect
of the 1981 reconciliation process, voiced two concerns about the
ramifications of the speed with which reconciliation procedures have
been carried out. "First," Stockman said, "the reconciliation bill must
be formulated so quickly that it will be amazing if there are not defects
here or there because of the lack of time to analyze the full implica-
tions, both legal and programmatic as well as budgetary, of all the
measures enacted."'' Stockman also pointed out that under reconcili-
ation "there is a natural selection process under which relatively simple
budget reduction proposals tend to be favored over relatively complex
or perhaps even more appropriate ones given the severe time restraint
under which the process is operating."' 7
Advocates of reconciliation have argued that, despite its flaws, rec-
onciliation has become a necessary vehicle for bringing federal spend-
ing, especially entitlement spending, under control. Congressional
Budget Office Director Rivlin has asserted that "Congress will continue
to face in the years ahead the need to make changes in the levels of
mandatory spending programs (i.e., entitlements). Reconciliation is
very likely to remain a necessary, though unpleasant, part of the budget
process for the next few years."'' 7 3
168. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
169. Commenting on the 1981 reconciliation procedure, Chairman Pete Domenici of the Senate
Budget Committee observed that reconciliation "is obviously now a tool-a process for
budget restraint, inordinate budget restraint-that you use when you want to do something
very different." 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 257.
170. Hearings, supra note 4, at 88 (Statement of Rep. Jamie Whitten, D-Miss.).
171. Id at 46 (testimony of OMB Director David Stockman).
172. Id
173. Id at 139 (statement of CBO Director Alice Rivlin).
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In addition to its major impact on federal programs, reconciliation
has also affected the government's structure. Both OMB Director
Stockman and Stuart Eizenstat, a former aide to President Carter, have
observed that reconciliation possesses some characteristics of a parlia-
mentary system of government. 174 Their observation focuses on the
centralized character of reconciliation, especially as used in 1981 by the
Reagan Administration and Republican congressional leaders. 175 The
1981 reconciliation instructions and the final reconciliation bill were
drafted by Republican party leaders and passed by Congress with a
degree of party discipline highly unusual in the United States. 17 6 The
parliamentary character of reconciliation may have shown some strain,
though, in 1982 when the House voted to consider one piece of its rec-
onciliation bill separately.' 77 Without its omnibus approach, a recon-
ciliation bill might not be able to attract the kind of party discipline
which the President mustered in 1981.
Reconciliation additionally affected another facet of government
organization: the committee structure of Congress. Specifically, the ap-
propriations committees, traditionally viewed as institutional restraints
on federal spending,178 have lost power to the budget committees and
authorizing committees. This transpired in the 1981 reconciliation pro-
cedure when the budget committees instructed the authorizing commit-
tees to effect massive budget cuts through alterations of authorizing
legislation. 179 Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or.), Chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, argued that reduction of authorizations
was unnecessary because "appropriations committees have their own
Section 302 allocations which cover these same programs."' 180 Con-
gressman Leon Panetta (D-Cal.) asserted that:
Another problem with reconciling authorizations is that Congress has
to decide twice what spending levels will be for a particular program.
This is because the appropriation committees are not required to fund
a program at the exact level set by the authorization committees-it
can be funded at a lower level, or in some rare cases at a higher
level.' 8'
Yet, defenders of reconciliation believe that using reconciliation to re-
duce authorizations is necessary to overcome the parochial interests of
program constituencies and subcommittees. 8 2  Furthermore, Senate
Budget Committee Chairman Pete Domenici (R-N.M.) argued that:
the revisions in authorizations reflect Congress' conclusion that autho-
174. Id at 50 (testimony of OMB Director David Stockman); 1982 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 117
(1982).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13.
176. 1981 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 245, 256.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 148-51.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
180. Hearings, supra note 4, at 79.
181. Id at 178.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
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rizations are a limitation on appropriations. . . . If we were to appro-
priate routinely without regard to the decisions of the authorizing
committees, their participation in the fiscal policy and nationalpriority
decisions of the Congress would become largely superfluous.'"
Appropriations and Continuing Resolutions
In providing that Congress could not act on spending bills prior to
the first resolution, the drafters of the Budget Act nevertheless did not
anticipate any problems in meeting the September deadline for enact-
ing the spending bills. 184 Unfortunately, seven years of experience with
the new budget process has belied the drafter's expectations. Not since
1978 has Congress been able to pass all thirteen appropriation bills on
time.185 Since then, Congress has passed no more than four appropria-
tion bills before the start of the fiscal year. 186 Consequently, since 1979,
continuing resolutions have become a principal source of funding for
federal programs.'87
Congress' inability to meet the September deadline for spending
bills has had two noteworthy effects. First, Congress' failure to pass
timely spending bills creates a proliferation of continuing resolutions
that causes problems for recipients of federal funds. The delay ad-
versely affects schools, federal agencies and other levels of government
in planning their budgets.
188
Second, the failure to pass spending bills on time has created, over
the past few years, a periodic risk of government shutdown like the
debacle of November 23, 1981. Shutdowns waste time and money, in-
terrupt governmental services, and dampen federal employee's
morale. 89
General Impact of the Budget Process
Aside from the obvious impact of the congressional budget process
on the federal budget and the economy as a whole, the budget process
also affects Congress' nonbudgetary efforts. As already noted, during
the past three years reconciliation has significantly affected legislation
183. Hearings, supra note 4, at 44.
184. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 64, at 62, reprinted at 3604.
185. See infra figure 4.
186. Id By October 1, 1983, four of the 13 appropriations bills had been passed. These bills were
for the following appropriations categories: housing and urban development, legislative, en-
ergy-water and transportation.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87, 104-08, 128-39.
188. United States Comptroller General Charles Bowsher has commented that the passage of a
continuing resolution, followed by an appropriation bill, and still later a supplemental ap-
propriation, causes agencies to "apportion, allocate, and administer their funds three times
for the fiscal year instead of one." Budget Reform Act of 1982. Hearings on S. 2629 Before
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1982) (testimony of
Charles Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States) [hereinafter cited as Bowsher
Testimony].
189. Id at 9-10.
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authorizing federal programs.' 90 Moreover, the budget process as cur-
rently operating has affected nonbudgetary legislation by precluding
Congress from devoting adequate time to nonbudgetary matters,' 9'
particularly because Congress has concentrated on one stopgap fund-
ing measure after another. For example, during the second session of
the 97th Congress, Congress failed to act on such pressing matters as
proposals governing bankruptcy courts, President Reagan's Carribean
Basin Initiative, a new immigration bill, and the expiring Clean Air
and Clean Water Acts.1
9 2
Deficiencies in the Budget Act
The foregoing review of the congressional budget process points out
several deficiencies in the Budget Act. First, the Budget Act unnecessa-
rily provides for a second concurrent budget resolution. While origi-
nally intended to serve as a binding instrument of fiscal discipline
which would adjust the previous spring's budget resolution to economic
conditions in late summer, the second resolution has instead become an
afterthought in the budget process. The resolution's formulation
through an adding-up process, the delays in adoption of the resolution,
the pro forma resolution for fiscal 1982, and the abandonment of the
resolution for fiscal 1982 and fiscal 1983 illustrate this phenomenon.
Moreover, the drafters of the Budget Act should have anticipated the
resolution's ineffectiveness. A resolution scheduled for adoption only
two weeks before the start of the fiscal year and following action on all
of the spending bills, cannot realistically play a significant role in the
budget process. At most, the drafters should have expected the second
resolution to hold the line on supplemental appropriations during a
fiscal year. Practically though, when Congress desires additional funds,
the second resolution does not serve as a constraint.
Second, congressional committees do not effectively participate in
formulating the first budget resolution. Specifically, the provision re-
quiring the transmission of views and estimates to the budget commit-
tees by March 15 allows inadequate time for development of significant
committee input. The need to allay tensions between the budget com-
mittees, authorizing committees, and appropriations committees high-
lights this deficiency.
Third, the Budget Act failed to recognize where the reconciliation
process would be of most value. The reconciliation process has not
materialized as the drafters anticipated. Nevertheless, the budget prep-
aration for fiscal years 1980, 1981, and 1982 demonstrates that reconcil-
190. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100, 112-13, 148.
191. Hearings Before the House Rules Committee Task Force on the Budget Process, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (September 29, 1982) (statement of Sen. William Roth, R-Del.) [hereinafter cited as
Roth Testimony].
192. Isaacson, Not Our Finest Hour, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983 at 43.
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iation can be an extremely effective procedure when used in
conjunction with the first budget resolution.
Fourth, the Budget Act has failed to motivate Congress to enact
timely spending bills. A government by continuing resolution has re-
sulted, which has in turn placed agencies and other levels of govern-
ment receiving federal funds in an uncertain position. Moreover,
continuing resolutions are the antithesis of the Budget Act's goal to es-
tablish procedures for a deliberate, disciplined crafting of the federal
budget prior to the start of each fiscal year.
Finally, in providing for an extensive annual budget process, the
Budget Act has not allowed sufficient time for congressional action on
nonbudgetary matters.
SENATE BILL 20: A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE BUDGET ACT
Revisions of the Budget Act
Biennial Budget
Senator William Roth (R-Del.), Chairman of the Senate Govern-
mental Affairs Committee, introduced S. 20 on January 25, 1983.193
The most significant change S. 20 proposes for the congressional
budget process is a two-year fiscal period. Senate Bill 20 proposes that
the fiscal period begin on January 1 of each even-numbered year, in-
corporating the second session of a Congress and the first session of the
succeeding Congress. 94 Congress would adopt a federal budget during
its first session and devote the second session to committees' oversight
on various programs and activities. 95
Single Binding Budget Resolution
The second significant change S. 20 proposes is elimination of the
second budget resolution. 96 Like the Budget Act's second resolution,
the Roth bill's single budget resolution would be binding. Conse-
quently, consideration of any appropriation measure which would
cause the resolution's level of total new budget authority to be ex-
ceeded would be subject to a point or order. 97 If no point of order
were raised, such a bill, resolution, or amendment could still be invali-
dated under a provision of S. 20 prohibiting their enrollment. 9 8 The
bill adds additional force to the budget resolution by providing that a
subsequent resolution could only be adopted by a two-thirds vote of
193. S. 20, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 212-13 (1983). The bill was originally intro-
duced June 15, 1982 as S. 2629, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 6749-6807 (1982).
194. S. 20, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b)(3) (1983).
195. Id § 3(d).
196. Id § 3(m).
197. Id § 3(n).
198. Id § 3(n)(2). The bill would amend section 904(b) of the act to prohibit the Senate from
waiving this provision; whereas, currently the Senate may waive any provision of Titles III
and IV. Id. § 3(r).
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both Houses of Congress (a "super-majority"). 99 The deadline for
adoption of the budget resolution would be two weeks later than for the
current first budget resolution-May 31 (of each odd-numbered year)
instead of May 15.20 The resolution would be reported by the budget
committees on April 30 (of each odd-numbered year) instead of on
April 15.201
Reconciliation
Senate Bill 20 does not provide for reconciliation instructions in the
single binding budget resolution. Rather, the bill provides that Con-
gress can invoke the reconciliation procedure by a concurrent resolu-
tion any time after it has adopted the single binding budget
resolution.2 °2 Within sixty days following adoption of a concurrent res-
olution invoking reconciliation,20 3 Congress would be required to com-
plete action on the resolution.
Omnibus Appropriations Bill
The fourth major change S. 20 proposes is to replace the current
thirteen separate appropriations bills with one omnibus appropriations
bill. 21 On June 15 of each odd-numbered year, the House Appropria-
tions Committee would report the omnibus bill for the two-year fiscal
period. The full House would complete action regarding the omnibus
bill by July 31.205 The Senate Budget Committee would report its om-
nibus bill the seventh day after Labor Day of each odd-numbered year,
and the full Senate would complete its action on the bill by September
30.206 Congress would then have until October 15 to complete action on
the omnibus appropriations bill.20 7
Analysis of Senate Bill 20
Biennial Budget
Several reasons have been suggested for adopting a two-year fiscal
period. First, large segments of the federal budget can be influenced
only over several years, thus making a biennial budget preferable to an
annual budget. Office of Management and Budget Director Stockman
has argued that "both the Congress and Executive need to view the
199. Id § 3(h). The bill would amend section 904(b) of the Act to prohibit the Senate from
waiving this provision; whereas, currently the Senate may waive any provision of Titles III
and IV. d. §3(r).
200. Id. § 3(e)(2).
201. Id § 3(e)(5).
202. Id § 3(m)(2).
203. Id § 3(m)(4).
204. Id § 30).
205. Id
206. Id.
207. Id The bill would also amend section 309 of the Act to provide that all legislation providing
new entitlement spending authority be completed no later than September 30 of each odd-
numbered year. Id. § 3(1).
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budget in a multi-year perspective [because] a large portion of the
budget cannot be changed quickly [due to] long lags between policy
changes and actual outlay effects."2 °8
Second, as CBO Director Rivlin suggested, utilizing "creative ac-
counting" to minimize deficit projections would become more difficult
under a biennial budget.20
9
Third, the development of budget resolutions in odd-numbered
years would allow difficult budget votes to arise in a nonelection
year.21 ° Congress highlighted the difficulty of making tough budgeting
decisions during congressional election years when in 1982 it aban-
doned the second budget resolution and postponed any action on So-
cial Security reform until after the election.2 '
Fourth, under the S. 20 scheme, the biennial budget would be
"adopted during the first year of a President's term, when there is more
chance of consensus between the President and the Congress. '21 2 The
overwhelming success of President Reagan's budget initiatives in 1981
supports this contention. 213  The proposed timetable could disadvan-
tage a new President, however, because it would afford him little time
to develop comprehensive budgetary policies or to alter the budget sub-
mitted by his predecessor.21 4 Perhaps S. 20 should be altered to delay
adoption of the budget resolution from May 31 until mid- or late June.
A suggested institutional advantage of the S. 20 timetable is that it
would leave each Congress free to perform "the searching review of
major policy actions that is so needed" 215 in its second session. This
alteration would permit Congress to review federal spending, inquire
into whether particular programs are achieving their purposes, and ex-
amine the resPective roles and responsibilities of federal and state
government.2 1
A final, and perhaps most compelling argument supporting the S.
20 timetable, is the stability it would lend to federal funding and to the
budget process as a whole. Federal agencies would be able to make
208. Hearings, supra note 4, at 67 (OMB Director Stockman's Responses to Written Questions
Submitted by Senator Roth). The House Rules Committee Report on the Budget Act ex-
plained that the lag between policy changes and actual outlay effects is attributable to "carry-
over balances." For another example of the lag time involved in efforts to reduce outlays, see
Hearings, supra note 4, at 58 (testimony of OMB Director Stockman).
209. Budget Reform Act of 1982. Hearing on S. 2629 Before the Senate Committee on Governmen-
tal4ffairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1982) (statement of CBO Director Alice Rivlin) [herein-
after cited as Rivlin Testimony].
210. Bowsher Testimony, supra note 188, at 4.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47, 192.
212. Bowsher Testimony, supra note 188, at 40.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13.
214. Bowsher Testimony, supra note 188, at 41.
215. Rivlin Testimony, supra note 209, at 23. See also Roth Testimony, supra note 191, at 3; and
Bowsher Testimony, supra note 188, at 54.
216. Rivlin Testimony, supra note 209, at 24-25. Though S. 20 would retain May 15 of the budget
preparation year as the deadline for program authorizations, CBO Director Rivlin has sug-
gested that all authorizations be made during the second session of each Congress since
"[aluthorizing legislation is an activity that is more closely linked to the oversight and broad
policy role that the bill places in the second session." Id.
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longer range plans without the fear of losing funds at the end of the
year,217 or during the year as threatened by the recent wave of stopgap
funding.218 State and local governments, especially those governments
with biennial budgets, could plan their own budgets more efficiently.219
Indeed, a General Accounting Office study of timing problems between
the federal, state, and local budget processes found that "most state and
local governments must have definitive federal information six months
before the start of their fiscal years. 220 Comptroller General Charles
Bowsher stated, "It is for this reason that we recommend that consider-
ation be given. . . for funding decisions to operate on a two-year cy-
cle, with advance funding by one year. '"22 ' Additionally, schools
receiving federal funds would benefit from more stable governmental
budgeting.222 Finally, more stable governmental budgeting could have
a positive effect on financial markets and interest rates.
223
Single Binding Budget Resolution
Because a single budget resolution is more realistic, it is preferable
to the two resolutions mandated by the Budget Act. Presently the sec-
ond resolution follows too closely after the first resolution to allow
Congress to respond t9 any significant economic developments. Fur-
thermore, the second budget resolution is scheduled too close to the
start of the fiscal year to accommodate any important changes in
policy.
Because the proposed single budget resolution is binding, it has
been suggested that it could enable Congress to "more effectively meas-
ure and implement its spending decisions" than the present procedure
of issuing 302(a) targets to the committees.224 Aggregate restraints im-
posed upon congressional spending prior to enactment of spending leg-
islation would control government spending more effectively than the
present system of establishing target levels for the spending commit-
tees. A shift of power from the appropriations committees to the
budget committees could result from this proposal because the appro-
priations committees would be subject to the spending ceilings set by
the budget committees rather than to the less effective targets currently
provided under the Budget Act. If, however, the appropriations com-
mittees were accorded a greater role in oversight of federal spending,
the inter-committee tensions resulting from this shift of power might be
alleviated.
217. Rivlin Testimony, supra note 209, at 23.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86, 104-08, 128-39.
219. Bowsher Testimony, supra note 188, at 50-5 1.
220. Id.
221. Id at 51.
222. Hearings, supra note 4, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. William Roth).
223. Roth Testimony, supra note 191, at 3.
224. 1982 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 118 (quoting Senate Budget Committee Chairman Pete
Domenici).
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The requirement of a "super-majority" in both Houses for altera-
tion of the single binding budget resolution is grounded in the desire to
strengthen the binding nature of the budget resolution. Arguably with-
out this additional requirement, the budget resolution could be easily
replaced by subse uent resolutions, and thus weaken the resolution's
disciplinary effect. 21 However, CBO Director Rivlin explains that
only three situations justify changing a budget resolution: (1) a change
in the economy, (2) a technical change in spendout rates or tax collec-
tion rates, and (3) a congressional desire to make a change in policy.226
Rivlin asserts that a change in the economy and a technical change in
spendout rates should not require a super-majority. Rivlin's assertion
has merit because no special obstacles should prevent adjustments to
the budget resolution necessitated by unavoidable factors. Rivlin also
argues that changing a budget resolution for policy reasons requires
flexibility to accommodate unforeseen changes in domestic and foreign
policy needs. 227 In addition, requiring a simple majority to pass an
initial budget resolution while requiring a super-majority for any sub-
sequent revisions of that resolution invests the initial resolution major-
ity of fifty percent plus one with a degree of power not commensurate
with its size. This scheme, in effect, gives the members of the fifty per-
cent plus one majority weighted votes relative to subsequent, larger
majorities who wish to alter the resolution, but who are unable to mus-
ter the votes required for a super-majority.
Reconciliation
The two month reconciliation procedures set forth in S. 20 is a com-
pelling procedure. First, it remedies the Budget Act's failure to recog-
nize the importance of the reconciliation procedure. Second, S. 20
provides sixty days, a sufficient amount of time, for the reconciliation
procedure, unlike the Budget Act which provides only ten days.228 Fi-
nally, the bill provides flexibility by allowing Congress to invoke the
procedure any time during preparation for a fiscal year, or during a
fiscal year. Limiting the procedure to strictly monetary issues might,
however, be a sensible addition to the proposal.229
Omnibus Appropriations Bill
Several arguments support the omnibus appropriations bill. First,
the omnibus bill would insure compliance with the budget resolu-
tion.23° Senate Bill 20 would prohibit enrollment of any bill which
would breach the single binding budget resolution; thus an omnibus
225. Roth Testimony, supra note 191, at 8.
226. Rivlin Testimony, supra note 209, at 25-26.
227. Id
228. Rivlin Testimony, supra note 209, at 21-22.
229. Id.
230. Rivlin Testimony, supra note 209, at 22.
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bill would force Congress to reconcile federal spending with the budget
ceilings. Failure to reconcile the two would leave the entire Federal
Government without funding. Moreover, Congress would be reluctant
to waive a budget ceiling which it had adopted four and a half months
earlier.23'
Second, an omnibus appropriations bill would promote timely
adoption of appropriations measures by reducing the number of bills to
be enacted. 232 The counter argument is that time would be saved at the
expense of the examination of detail that goes into the adoption of thir-
teen separate appropriations bills. However, S. 20 provides Congress
with four months to consider the details of the omnibus bill which is
certainly preferable to the summary way in which Congress has han-
dled its stopgap funding measures in recent years. Nevertheless, to al-
leviate potential problems with its time frame, S. 20 should be amended
to provide the House Appropriations Committee more time to formu-
late the omnibus bill before it reports the bill to the House floor. As
proposed, S. 20 denies the Appropriations Committee sufficient time
following adoption of the budget resolution.233
Finally, the omnibus approach to appropriations incorporates the
advantage of "clearly expos[ing] in one place the trade-offs that need to
be made among programs. ' 234 Members of Congress should be able to
see all the individual programs juxtaposed. To live within a frugal
budget, Congress must prioritize federal expenditures on a program-
by-program basis; however, prioritizing requires a substantial amount
of time and effort. The omnibus bill provides the House of Representa-
tives with one and a half months to consider the bill, but provides the
Senate with only fifteen days.235 To avoid the summary review ac-
corded the 1981 Omnibus Reconciliation Bill by the House of Repre-
sentatives, the Senate needs more than fifteen days to consider the new
omnibus bill. Therefore, the October 15 deadline for the omnibus bill
should be extended.
CONCLUSION
An effective congressional budget process is vital to today's econ-
omy. As CBO Director Rivlin testified, "unless the process deals effec-
tively with slowing spending growth in national defense and
entitlement programs as well as discretionary accounts and unless it is
effective in phasing in some growth in revenues, the budget deficit out-
look will not improve. 236
The Budget Act of 1974, however, is in trouble. The Act has failed
231. See supra text accompanying note 201.
232. Rivlin Testimony, supra note 209, at 22.
233. See supra text accompanying note 206.
234. Rivlin Testimony, supra note 209, at 22.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 204-07.
236. Rivlin Testimony, supra note 209, at 14.
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to produce timely spending bills;237 the reconciliation procedure has
deviated substantially from the Act;23 8 the second budget resolution has
been abandoned; 39 and Congress has not had sufficient time for im-
portant nonbudgetary processes such as oversight. 240 Nevertheless, the
Budget Act has produced a healthy concern for, and awareness of, the
impact of the federal budget on our national economic health. To
avoid losing this crucial advance in its budgetary procedures, Congress
should amend the Budget Act promptly and alleviate its deficiencies.
Senate Bill 20 provides a vehicle for the necessary changes.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 184-89.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 167-83
239. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
240. Roth Testimony, supra note 191, at 4.
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FIGURE 1: EXAMPLE OF A FIRST RESOLUTION
That the Congress hereby determines and declares that the Second Concurrent
Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1982 is hereby revised, the First Con-
current Resolution on the Budgetfor Fiscal Year 1983 is hereby established, and
the appropriate budgetary levels for Fiscal years 1984 and 1985 are hereby set
forth.
(a) The following budgetary levels are appropriatefor the fiscal years begin-
ning on October 1, 1981, October 1, 1982, October 1, 1983, and October 1, 1984.
(1) The recommended levels of Federal revenues are as follows-.
Fiscal year 1982. $628,400,000,000.
Fiscal year 1983. $665,900,000,000.
Fiscal year 1984 $738,000,000,000.
Fiscal year 1985. $821,400,000,000.
and the amounts by which the aggregate levels of Federal revenues should
be changed are as follows."
Fiscal year 1982. -$200,000,000.
Fiscal year 1983"- +$20,900,000,000.
Fiscal year 1984 +$36,000,000,000.
Fiscal year 1985. +$41,400,000,000.
(2) The appropriate levels of total new budget authority are as /ollows:
Fiscal year 1982: $777,672,000,000.
Fiscal year 1983: $822,390,000,000
Fiscal year 1984 $878,473,000,000.
Fiscal year 1985: $960,611,000,000.
(3) The appropriate levels of total budget outlays are as follows.
Fiscal year 1982 $734,100,000,000.
Fiscal year 1983: $769,818,000,000.
Fiscal year 1984 $821,928,000,000.
Fiscal year 1985 $881,356,000,000.
(4) The amounts of the deficits in the budget which are appropriate in the
light of economic conditions and all other relevantfactors are asfollows
Fiscal year 1982 $105,700,000,000.
Fiscal year 1983: $103,918,000,000
Fiscal year 1984 $83,928,000,000.
Fiscal year 1985 $59,956,000,000.
(5) The appropriate levels of the public debt are as follows."
Fiscal year 1982: $1,143,100,000,000.
Fiscal year 1983: $1,290,200,000,000.
Fiscal year 1984: $1,420,219,000,000.
Fiscal year 1985: $1,533,491,000,000
and the amounts by which the current temporary statutory limits on such
debt should be accordingly increased are asfollows.
Fiscal year 1982: $63,300,000,000
Fiscal year 1983: $147,100,000,000.
Fiscal year 1984: $130,019,000,000.
Fiscal year 1985: $113,272,000,000.
(6) The appropriate levels of total Federal credit activity for the fiscal
years beginning on October 1, 1981, and October 1, 1982, are asfollows:
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Fiscal year 1982."
(A) New direct loan obligations, $63,600,000,000.
(B) New primary loan guarantee commitments,
$74,900,000,000.
(C) New secondary loan guarantee commitments,
$69,000,000,000.
Fiscal year 1983.
(A) New direct loan obligations, $59,700,000,000.
(B) New primary loan guarantee commitments,
$101,900,000,000.
(B) New secondary loan guarantee commitments,
$68,300,000,000.
SOURCE: CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, FIRST CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE
BUDGET-FISCAL YEAR 1983, S. REP. No. 478, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1982).
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FIGURE 2: EXAMPLE OF 302(a) ALLOCATIONS
ALLOCATION OF SPENDING RESPONSIBILITY TO HOUSE
COMMITTEES PURSUANT TO SEC. 302(a) OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT-FISCAL YEAR 1982
[in millions of dollars]
Direct spending jurisdiction
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400 Transportation .................







150 International Affairs ...........





































550 H ealth .........................
600 Income Security ...............
700 Veterans Benefits and Services .




















370 Commerce and Housing Credit.
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FIRST CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE
S. REP. No. 478, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1982).
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FIGURE 3: EXAMPLE OF RECONCILIATION
INSTRUCTIONS
RECONCILIATION
Sec. 2. (a) Not later than July 20, 1982, the Senate committees named in
subsection (b)(1) through (7) of this section shall submit their recommendations
to the Senate Committee on the Budget and not later than August 1, 1982, the
House committees named in subsection (c)(1) through (10) of this section shall
submit their recommendations to the House Committee on the Budget. Those
recommendations shall be sufficient to accomplish the reductions required by
subsections (b) and (c) of this section. After receiving those recommendations, the
Committees on the Budget shall report to the House and Senate a reconciliation
bill or resolution or both carrying out all such recommendations without any
substantive revision.
SENATE COMMITTEES
(b)(1) The Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry shall
report changes in laws within the jurisdiction of that committee, (A) to require
reductions in appropriations for programs authorized by that committee so as to
achieve savings in budget authority and outlays, or (B) which provide spending
authority as defined in section 401(c)(2)(C) of Public Law 93-344, sufficient to
reduce budget authority and outlays, or (C) any combination thereof asfollows."
$779,000,000 in budget authority and $779,000,000 in outlays in fiscal year 1983;
$1,083,000,000 in budget authority and $1,083,000,000 in outlays in fiscal year
1984; and $1,428,000,000 in budget authority and $1,428,000,000 in outlays in
fiscal year 1985.
(2) The Senate Committee on Armed Services shall report changes in laws
within the jurisdiction of that committee which provide spending authority as
defned in section 401 (c) (2) (C) of Public Law 93-344, sufficient to reduce budget
authority by $213,000,000 and outlays by $213,000,000 in fiscal year 1983; to
reduce budget authority by $693,000,000 and outlays by $693,000,000 in fiscal
year 1984; and to reduce budget authority by $1,231,000,000 and outlays by
$1,231,000,000 in fiscal year 1985.
(3) The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs shall
report changes in laws within the Jurisdiction of that committee which provide
spending authority as defined in section 401(c)(2)(C) of Public Law 93-344,
sufficient to reduce budget authority by $0 and outlays by $695,000,000 in fiscal
year 1983; to reduce budget authority by $0 and outlays by $697,000,000 in fiscal
year 1984; and to reduce budget authority by $0 and outlays by $687,000,000 in
fiscal year 1985.
SOURCE: CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, FIRST CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ON THE
BUDGET-FISCAL YEAR 1983, S. REP. No. 478, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
12 (1982).
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